NOTE
CIVIL PROCEDURE: SECTION 0343(3)
JURISDICTION AND THE PROPERTYPERSONAL RIGHT DISTINCTION
In Eisen v. Eastman,' Judge Henry J. Friendly attempted to
clarify some of the recurring problems surrounding the
interpretation of section 1343(3) of title 28, which provides the
district courts with original jurisdiction for any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United StatesO

Section 1343(3) originated in the Civil Rights Act of 187 13 as the

jurisdictional implementation of section 1983, which created a cause
of action to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.4 Since
the original jurisdiction of the district courts may be invoked under
section 1343(3) without a meeting of the $10,000 jurisdictional
1. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
3. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
4. This substantive provision was originally found in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, as was its jurisdictional counterpart, the present 28
U.S.C. § 1343 (3). The substantive provision, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964),
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The phrase "and laws" was added in the Revised Statutes of 1875, REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875),
which attempted to codify the existing law. There is no apparent explanation for the addition
of this phrase to the original provision which referred only to "rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the Constitution.... See Comment, The Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe,
49 CALIF. L. REv. 145, 149 (1961); 16 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 260, 262 (1948). For a discussion
of the problem of interpretation engendered by the difference in language between section 1983
("and laws") and section 1343(3) ("any Act of Congress providing for equal rights") see
notes 69-70 infra and accompanying text.
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amount required under the general "federal question" provision,5 the
scope of section 1343(3) is frequently in controversy. In Eisen Judge
Friendly reluctantly6 continued the Second Circuit's utilization of
Mr. Justice Stone's test from Hague v. CIO7 that the jurisdictional
amount requirement could be avoided "whenever the right or
immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence
upon the infringement of property rights.
"8
The plaintiff in Eisen brought an action in the district court
under sections 1983 and 1343(3), alleging that a New York City
Rent and Rehabilitation Director violated Eisen's constitutional
right not to be deprived of property without due process of law by
reducing the rents that he could charge under the City's rent control
law. The district court, although finding that the action could not
be sustained under section 1983 because the Civil Rights Act was not
intended to apply to suits against municipalities, sustained
jurisdiction under section 1331 since Eisen's losses from the rent
deductions would possibly exceed the $10,000 jurisdictional amount
within three years..
On appeal, Judge Friendly quickly disposed of the district court's
conclusion that Monroe v. Pape" barred this suit by pointing out
that the action was not against New York City but against Director
Eastman and that an action against a state official acting under
color of law iswhat section 1983 is "mainly about."" Although the
action was .not barred as a suit agaiast a municipality, it did not
necessarily follow that the action was within the scope of section
1343(3). Noting that the Supreme Court had not thoroughl'
discussed this section since Hague v. CIO"2 was decided in 1939,
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."
6. Although the Second Circuit had not squarely faced the issue, 421 F.2d at 565, Judge
Friendly, "with a good deal less than complete assurance," held that "Justice Stone's Hague
formulation generously construed, should continue to be the law of the circuit." Id. at 566.
See Russo v. Shapiro, 309 F. Supp. 385,390 (D. Conn. 1969).
7. 307 U.S.496 (1939).
8. Id. at 531.
9. The district court decision is unreported.

10. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court in Monroe, after extensively
examining the legislative history of section 1983, held that Congress had intended that no
municipal liability should attach under section 1983.
11. 421 F.2d at563.
12. 307 U.S.496 (1939).
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Judge Friendly reconsidered some of the problems then confronting
the Court in attempting to define the scope of this jurisdictional
grant.
The Hague Decision
The plaintiffs in Hague, individuals and unincorporated labor
organizations, brought suit in a federal district court to enjoin
various city officials from enforcing ordinances which allegedly
violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly. The plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that a city
had wrongfully denied them a permit to assemble by invoking an
ordinance prohibiting the leasing of any hall for a public meeting at
which the overthrow of the government would be advocated. The
plaintiffs, without conceding the validity of the ordinance,
maintained that the purpose of their meeting was not to advocate
the overthrow of the government but to explain the purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act. The district court found jurisdiction
under what are presently sections 1331, 1343(1), and 1343(3),13 and
the court of appeals affirmed as to sections 1331 and 1343(3).14 On
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction could not be
founded upon section 1331 because the record was bare of any
valuation of the asserted rights. 15 But in separate opinions by
Justices Roberts and Stone, a majority of the court affirmed
jurisdiction under the present section 1343(3).
Justice Roberts phrased the question as whether "freedom to
disseminate information concerning the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act . . .is a privilege or immunity of a citizen of
the United States secured against state abridgement by § 1 of the
fourteenth amendment, and whether . . . [sections 1983 and 1343]
afford redress in a federal court for such abridgement.""6 He
concluded that the right to discuss federal legislation was an
attribute of national citizenship secured by the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment and that section
7
1343(3) provided jurisdiction over the deprivation of such a right
Justice Stone emphatically rejected Justice Roberts' attempt to
13. 25 F. Supp. 127 (D.N.J. 1938).
14. 101 F2d 774, 787-90 (3d Cir. 1939).
15. 307 U.S. at 507-08.

16. 307 U.S. at512.
17. Id. at 513.

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1970:819

add new vitality to the privileges and immunities clause and felt the
effort unnecessary and unwise, since Stone found that freedom of
speech and assembly are rights secured to all persons, regardless of
citizenship, by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.,8
Although he acknowledged that the right to assemble and discuss the
National Labor Relations Act might be secured by the privileges and
immunities clause to citizens of the United States, 9 there was no
allegation or finding that any of the plaintiffs were United States
citizens. Stone noted that if the decision was to rest on the privileges
and immunities clause, the decree was too broad since the plaintiffs
should be protected, under that theory, in disseminating information
concerning nationallegislation only, and the decree should guarantee
only the rights of United States citizens, not all persons. Preferring
"to avoid the unnecessary creation of novel constitutional
doctrines,""0 he believed that section 1983, in creating a cause of
action to redress the deprivation by state action of the rights secured
by the Constitution, allowed maintenance of the plaintiff's suit since
freedom of speech and assembly are rights secured to persons by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor of section 1983, had
directed that suits for violation of that Act be prosecuted in the
district and circuit courts and did not require a jurisdictional
amountP Congress in 1875 extended the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts to suits "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States" in which the amount in controversy exceeded $500.3 This
statute requiring a jurisdictional amount has since coexisted with the
18. Id. at 519.

19. Id. at 522.
20. Id. at 525.
21. Id. at 525-26.

22. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. Both the district and circuit courts had
jurisdiction of suits arising under section 1 of the 1871 Act. The Revised Statutes of 1875
separated the district and circuit court jurisdiction. Section 563(12) provided jurisdiction for
district courts while section 629(16) gave the circuit courts jurisdiction. In the revision of the
Judicial Code in 1911, the two provisions were merged with original jurisdiction retained only
in the district courts. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087. See Note, FederalJudiclal
Review of State Welfare Practices,67 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 112-13 (1967). See note 70 Infra

and accompanying text for the problem posed by the difference in language between sections
563(12) and 629(16) of the Revised Statutes of 1875.

23. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. The Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36
Stat. 1087, abolished the circuit courts and transferred their jurisdiction to the district courts,
The general "federal question" jurisdiction is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). See
note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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present section 1343(3), which confers jurisdiction of suits authorized
by section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and its successor, section
1983. Justice Stone considered it necessary to attempt a

reconciliation of the two provisions since all suits authorized by
section 1983 were, by definition, suits "arising
Constitution or laws of the United States."

under the

Stone was certain that Congress in 1875 had not intended to
withhold jurisdiction from the federal courts of suits which Congress

had authorized by the Civil Rights Act just four years earlier.
Furthermore, he reasoned that the continuance of both statutes in

the Judicial Code evidenced a congressional intention that suits
could be brought under section 1343(3) after, as well as before, the
1875 Act. The fact that the 1911 amendment to section 24(l) of the
Judicial Code, now section 1331, provided that this jurisdictional
amount requirement should not be construed as applicable to section

1343(3) cases 4 strengthened Stone's conclusion. He reasoned that
the two jurisdictional provisions could be harmonized only by

treating section 1343(3) as conferring federal jurisdiction for suits
brought under section 1983 when the "right asserted is inherently
incapable of pecuniary valuation."' Examining the only two cases

where the court had been confronted with the task of construing
section 1343(3),26 Stone concluded that
whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for
its existence upon the infringement of property rights, there is jurisdiction in
the district court under section 24(14) of the Judicial Code [section 1343(3)]
to entertain it without proof that the amount in controversy exceeds [the

requisite amount].7

Judge Friendly, although acknowledging that Stone's test "has
24. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, amended § 24(1) of the Judicial
Code to direct: "IT]he foregoing provision as to the sum of value of the matter in controversy
shall not be construed to apply to any of the succeeding paragraphs of this section." The
amendment also increased the jurisdictional amount to $3,000.
25. 307 U.S. at 530.
26. The two cases were Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900) and Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915). In Holt the plaintiff sought to restrain the state from taxing his patent
rights, alleging that he was exempt from taxation by virtue of federal patent law. Unable to
meet the jurisdictional amount, he brought his claim under section 1343(3). The Supreme
Court remarked: "Assuming they [sections 1343(3) and 1983] are still in force, .it is
sufficient to say that they refer to civil rights only and are inapplicable here." Id. at 72. The
court made no attempt to define "civil rights." For a discussion of Truax see notes 42 & 43
infra and accompanying text.
27. 307 U.S. at 531-32.
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been considerably easier to state than to apply," 2 nevertheless felt
that there is "something essentially right about it, especially if one
accepts, as we do, his premise that the overlap between 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) should be explained in
some rational way. '2 Friendly believed that the Stone formulation,
while preserving jurisdiction in the type of case Congress was
concerned about in 1871 and in which later Congresses would have
desired to be within the statute, had the merit of excluding cases that
neither the 1871 Congress nor later Congresses contemplated."
Although concluding that Stone's formulation "generously
construed" should be the law in the Second Circuit, Friendly found
no jurisdiction for Eisen's complaint under section 1343(3) since it
only alleged the loss of money?'
Property v. PersonalRight: Is It Always That Clear?
The first case construing section 1343(3) to reach the Supreme
Court after Hague illustrated the problems inherent in Stone's
formulation. In Douglas v. City of Jeannette,2 the plaintiffs,
Jehovah's Witnesses, brought suit under section 1343(3) to 'restrain
the City of Jeannette from criminally prosecuting them for *violating
a city ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of merchandise orders
without first procuring a license. Although refusing to grant
equitable relief, Justice Stone, writing for the majority, agreed that
the district court had jurisdiction since the Witnesses' contention
that the ordinance deprived them of the right of free speech stated a
cause of action under section 1983. At first glance, Douglas seenis
to fit snugly into Justice Stone's personal-property right
distinction,3 but closer examination raises questions. It appears
from the record thit the city was willing to allow the Witnesses to
distribute their literature free, but since their primary purpose was
to sell the material, the Witnesses responded that this would be
contrary to their method of "doing business." Indeed, the City was
28. 421 F.2dat564.
29. Id. at 565.
30. Id. at 565-66.
31. Id. at 566. American Commuters Ass'n. v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148, 1151 n.4 (2d Cir.
1969), decided earlier in 1969, had specifically avoided the question of whether section 1343(3)
could apply to "property rights."

32. 319 US. 157 (1943).
33. Judge Friendly lists Douglas as one of the cases clearly involving a right of personal
liberty. 421 F.2d at 564.
34. 319 U.S. at 168 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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prosecuting under an ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of orders
for merchandise, which would indicate that the right infringed was
a property right, that is, the right to distribute literature for sale.5

In addition to the property-personal right questions it raises,
Douglas brings into focus the importance of the proper formulation

of the Stone test. If the test for section 1343(3) jurisdiction is
whether the right infringed is "inherently incapable of pecuniary
valuation,""0 instead of the property-personal right distinction, were
not the rights which the Witnesses' claimed to be infringed capable
of pecuniary valuation? Although freedom of expression is clearly a

personal right rather than proprietary right, the Witnesses could
have "purchased" this right from the City by paying the license
fee? 7 In other words, if personal rights can be valued, should section

1343 (3)jurisdiction be precluded?3s
In 1947, the Sixth Circuit in Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control

Commission39 sustained section 1343(3) jurisdiction when the
plaintiff sought an injunction to regain a liquor license which she

alleged had been revoked by state officials purposefully
discriminating against her. There was no discussion of Stone's

property-personal right distinction, although revocation of a liquor
35. Compare Douglas with Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
In Adams a charitable association alleged that the city ordinance requiring city council
permission to solicit and collect funds was unconstitutional. The court upheld jurisdiction
under section 1343(3) on the theory that the right to disseminate information about charitable
organizations is a right of free speech, thus a "personal right." The court seems not to have
considered that the purpose of plaintiff's suit was to enable plaintiff to solicit funds, arguably
a "property right." It is interesting to note that in Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F.
Supp. 351 (N.D. 111.1965), Adams was cited for the proposition that section 1343(3) confers
jurisdiction for suits alleging only the deprivation of personal rights. Id. at 354. See note 36
infra and accompanying text.
36. Many commentators and judges simply express Stone's test as conferring section
1343(3) jurisdiction whenever the'right is "inherently incapable of pecuniary valuation," and
others use this phrase interchangeably with the property-personal right distinction. See, e.g.,
Bussie v. Long, 383 F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 1967); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 109-10
(1970). Judge Friendly, perhaps recognizing the problem which could be engendered, stated
that he thought Stone's formulation was to be found in the phrase "whenever the right or
immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of
property rights" rather than the phrase "incapable of valuation." 421 F.2d at 564 n.7.
37. Cf. Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934). There a merchant claimed that a state-wide
license tax violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The Court held that the amount
in controversy for purposes of meeting the jurisdictional requirement was the amount of the
disputed tax.

38. See D. CURRIE,

FEDERAL COURTS, CASES AND MATERIALS

428 (1968); H. M.

H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 841 (1953).
39. 160 F.2d96,97 (6thCir. 1947).

HART &
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license would appear to be a loss of a property right. Unless the case
is viewed as holding that the plaintiff was deprived of her right to
engage in the business of her choice, which could perhaps be
characterized as a personal right, the court appears to have ignored
Stone's distinction.' Glicker was the first of a long line of liquorlicense cases in which federal courts assumed jurisdiction under
section 1343(3) to redress the deprivation of what are at least
colorably "property rights."'"
The difficulty in distinguishing between proprietary and personal
interests is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in cases in which
employment discrimination is alleged to have deprived a person of
his job or livelihood in violation of the equal protection clause.
Truax v. Raich' 2 the first such case brought under section 1343(3),
was cited by Stone to support his property-personal right distinction.
Raich, an alien, sought to have an Arizona statute which required
that certain employers hire not less than 80 percent native-born
citizens declared unconstitutional. Threatened with discharge from
his job in order that his employer might comply with the statute,
Raich sought a restraining order, claiming that the statute deprived
him of equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction and stated that the right to work for a living "is the very
essence of . . . personal freedom. 4 3 Cases involving alleged
interference with employment rights or opportunities have generally
followed Truax and upheld jurisdiction under section 1343(3). For
instance, in Burt v. City of New York," an architect, claiming that
his applications for building permits were denied by city officials
because he was the victim of purposeful discrimination, successfully
obtained 1343(3) jurisdiction. And the First Circuit has similarly
upheld jurisdiction when school teachers alleged that municipal
40. See Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1289

(1953). Compare the cases involving employment discrimination cited at notes 42-46 infra.
41. Berry v. Allen, 411 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1969); Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen,
389 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
42. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
43. 239 US. at 41. See Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917). Justice Stone, in citing
Traux and Crane to support his distinction, stated: "[lIn both [cases] the gist of the cause of
action was not damage or injury to property, but unconstitutional infringement of a right of

personal liberty not susceptible of valuation in money." 307 U.S. at 531.
44. 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1946). See Birnbaum v. Trussel, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966)
(section 1343(3) jurisdiction allowed when the plaintiff, a public employee, alleged that he was
removed from his job on arbitrary grounds). Comment, The Civil Rights Act, Emergence of
an Adequate FederalCivilRemedy? 26 IND. L.J. 361, 367-68 (1951).

Vol. 1970:819]

PROPERTY-PERSONAL

RIGHTS

officials were impairing contractual obligations in violation of the

Constitution by preventing the allocation of sufficient funds to pay
teacher salaries.45 No doubt the right to earn a living can be
classified a "personal right" if one considers such concomitant

factors as the right to live where one pleases and to pursue the work
one enjoys, but arguably the loss of employment is primarily the loss

of wages, an item traditionally considered a proprietary interest.
Cases such as Glicker, Truax, and Burt, which seemingly involve

deprivation of proprietary interests, can probably be explained in
another way. When a person alleges that he is being deprived of a

liquor license or employment because of purposeful discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause, his right to be treated
equally has been infringed.' He is complaining not only of the

interest infringed-whether personal or proprietary-but of the fact
that he is being treated unequally. In other words, the right to

equality exists apart from the interest infringed, and the right to
equality is a personal right.47 It has thus been argued that sections

1343(3) and 1983 play an important function in equal protection
cases by providing a federal remedy for the deprivation of personal
rights which might otherwise be without means of redress.48
Recent Section 1343(3) Litigation

The Fifth Circuit, which has largely ignored Stone's formulation
without openly repudiating it, has generated substantial confusion
concerning section 1343(3). In Hornsby v. Allen, 49 Barnes v.
45. Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1953).
46. Justice Stone did not make an exception to his property-personal right distinction in
cases alleging a denial of equal protection. See 66 HARV. L. REv., supra note 40 at 1290. For
cases where the equal protection clause was unsuccessfully relied on to protect property
interests in a section 1343(3) suit, see 26 IND. L.J., supra note 44, at 367 n.33. For a case
where the court upheld section 1343(3) jurisdiction under the equal protection clause for a
claim involving only a property right, see Powell v. Workmens Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d
131 (2d Cir. 1964).
47. Compare this to a denial of due process where the plaintiff alleges infringement of an
independent interest, such as a property interest or right to be free from illegal search. 49
CALIF. L. REv., supra note 4, at 162. In alleging a denial of due process, the plaintiff claims
a deprivation of the substantive interest infringed, but in alleging a denial of equal protection
the plaintiff is claiming a deprivation not only of the substantive interest infringed but also
the deprivation of the right to be treated equally. Id.
48. Id. at 163.
49. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). In Hornsby and many other decisions, section 1343(3) is
not discussed, with only section 1983 being mentioned. Although the construction and scope
of the two statutes should be the same, see note 4 supra, recall that section 1983 is not
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Merritt," and Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen,5 1343(3)

jurisdiction was upheld to insure nondiscriminatory treatment in the
granting of liquor licenses by the state. Jurisdiction was similarly
granted when the plaintiff in Mansell v. SaunderV2 alleged that his
rights under the due process and equal protection clauses were
violated because he was denied a garbage collection franchise, while
in McGuire v. Sadler,53 ,the plaintiff claimed impairment of contract
obligations in violation of his constitutional rights when his land was
Wrongfully sold by the state land commissioner. In none of the above
cases can it be said that the right allegedly infringed was anything
other than a "property right" in the traditional sense.54
Bussie v. Long,55 which seemed to mark the Fifth Circuit's
retreat from its neglect of Stone's formulation, can probably be
explained in another way. Bussie was a class action brought by two
Louisiana taxpayers to compel members of the Louisiana Tax
Commission to discharge their duty under the Louisiana constitution
and statutes to establish the actual cash value for ad valorem tax
assessments and to equalize assessments. The court, relying on
Stone's property-personal right distinction, held that there was no
federal jurisdiction under section .1343(3) since only a property or
monetary right was involvedV6 Noting that-Hornsby, Mansell, and
McGuire involved only "property rights," the court acknowledged
"[t]here is admittedly a fine line of distinction between these cases
and the instant case,"57 but added that these holdings could not be
extended to cases involving'tax assessments. "Tax assessment" cases
may justifiably be excluded from section 1343(3) jurisdiction even 'if
the property-personal right distinction is not followed in other areas.
jurisdictional but only creates a cause of action. 49

CALIF.

L. REV., supra note 4, at 148. See

Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956), rev'd, 256 F.2d 728 (9th Cir.
1958) (discussion of the difference between sections 1343(3) and 1983).
50. 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967).
51. 389 F.2d713 (5th Cir. 1968).
52. 372 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1967).

53. 337 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1964) (alternate holding). See Blume v. City of Deland, 358 F.2d
698 (5th Cir. 1966) (section 1343(3) jurisdiction upheld when a property owner claimed

appropriation of property without due process). Cf.Ream v. Handley, 359 F.2d 728 (7th Cir.
1966).
54. It may be contended, however, that by an expansive reading of the "equality theory,"
see note 62 infra and accompanying text, these rights are personal rights.
55. 383 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1967).

56. 383 F.2d at 769.
57. Id.
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As most courts entertaining such cases have recognized,58 Congress
has expressed its desire that state courts are the proper forums to
adjudicate claims based on state tax statutes when a plain, speedy,

and efficient remedy is made available to the complainant in the
courts of such state 9 In Abernathy v. Carpenter,0 the Supreme

Court affirmed the district court's decision that section 1343(3) did
not confer jurisdiction over a claim by a nonresident taxpayer to be
exempted from certain state income taxes. But, instead of

reaffirming the vitality of Stone's property-personal right
formulation, these tax cases should be recognized as a special class

of case which Congress has expressly left to the state courts
whenever an adequate remedy is available.

In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, which prefers to ignore Justice
Stone's formulation without expressly criticizing it, at least two

courts has squarely faced the issue. In a recent California district
court case, the plaintiff alleged that tests given to applicants for
position with the Oakland Police Department were discriminatory

in natureYt The court was generally critical of Stone's formulation,
and stated that if it were faced with the problem as a matter of first

impression it would reject a strict "property-personal liberty" test
but concluded that even if the distinction were accepted, the
plaintiff's claim would have established 1343(3) jurisdiction since

employment is far more precious than a "mere property" right

3

The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has held that

section 1343(3) conferred jurisdiction for a complaint that the
Illinois Director of Insurance had deprived the plaintiff of property
without due process of law 4 The Director was attempting to levy
58. See, e.g., Gray v. Morgan, 371 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 US. 1033
(1967); Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn.
1966), affd per curiam, 386 U.S. 262 (1967); Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Opelika, 207 F.
Supp. 332 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Reiling v. Lacey, 93 F. Supp. 462 (D. Md. 1950), appeal
dismissed, 341 U.S. 901 (1951). Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala.), affd,
393 U.S. 9 (1968), another tax case, contains a good discussion of Bussie and the Fifth
Circuit's attempt to reconcile it with Hornsby, Mansell, and McGuire.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964) provides: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
60. Abernathy v. Carpenter, 208 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Mo. 1962), affdper curiam, 373 U.S.
241 (1963).
61. Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
62. Id.at 1245.
63. Id. at 1245-46.
64. Joe Louis Milk Co. v. Hershey, 243 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1965). See also Detroit
Edison Co. v. East China School Dist., 378 F2d 225 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932
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on the plaintiff for money allegedly owed to a defunct insurance
company which had issued contingent liability insurance policies
regardless of whether or not the "member'" had consented or
actually received any protection. The court stated that the language
of section 1343(3) expressed no distinction between the constitutional
protection afforded property rights and human rights and that there
was no logic or policy with which to make property rights less
deserving of protection.65 In rejecting the notion that it should
abstain because only property rights were involved, the court
observed that "to individuals of limited financial means, deprivation
of property can have as serious an effect as an infringement upon
personal liberty.""6
The Welfare Cases
/
The continuing validity of Stone's property-personal right
distinction becomes questionable when viewed with regard to federal
court jurisdiction over welfare cases. Although Judge Friendly
expressed concern that adherence to Stone's formula might have the
disadvantage of barring welfare recipients from federal forums, 7
apparently such is not the case. Although at first glance welfare
payments would appear to be a "property right," most federal
courts have found jurisdiction under section 1343(3) when welfare
claimants have alleged either infringement of constitutional rights or
the application of state laws or regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of the Social Security Act.68 Because of the difference in
language between sections 1983 and 1343(3),69 whether the statutory
claims could be brought under the latter has been questioned since
(1967); Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). These two cases involve

pure "property rights" which intimate a "latitudinarian view" with respect to Justice Stone's
distinction.
65. 243 F. Supp. at 354.
66. Id. at 357.

67. 421 F.2d at 566 n.10. Most welfare claims cannot be brought under section 1331 since
the amount in controversy would not exceed $10,000, and it is unlikely that plaintiffs in a
class action would be allowed to aggregate their claims. See 67 COLUM. L. REV.. supra note
22, at I11.
68. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416
(1967); Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd sub noma.
Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sweeny v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Assistance Bd., 33 F. Supp.
587 (M.D. Pa. 1940), affd, 119 F.2d 1023 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 611 (1941). But
see, McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969).
69. See note 4supra.
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the Social Security Act is not a law "providing for equal rights."7 0
But even if section 1343(3) is construed to confer jurisdiction over a
statutory claim only when the plaintiff is seeking relief under a "law
providing for equal rights," the welfare claimant will usually be

unaffected. Any offensive state practices are almost always
challenged on both constitutional and staturory grounds3' Under the

doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, the courts usually will have
jurisdiction over the statutory claim, even if the constitutional claim
fails on the merits7 2 and even if the statutory claim is not based upon

a law providing for equal rights.
Apparently only the Second Circuit has raised the objection that

welfare payments are "property rights" and thus outside the scope
of sections 1343(3) and 1983?Y Judge Friendly observed in Eisen that

every case in which the Supreme Court had sustained jurisdiction
under section 1343(3) could be encompassed in Stone's formulation
with the possible exception of King v. Smith.7 4 In that case

Alabama's "substitute father" regulation was invalidated because of
70. See 67 COLum. L. REv., supra note 22, at 112-14. Although section 1343(3) is now
worded so as to limit jurisdiction to suits to redress deprivations secured by "any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights", the origin of this limitation is unclear. When the
jurisdictional provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 were codified in the Revised Statutes
of 1875, sections 1979 (now section 1983) and 563(12), the provisions for civil rights
jurisdiction in the district courts, were identical in scope and contained no language limiting
the word "laws." But section 629(16), which provided circuit court jurisdiction over civil
rights suits, contained the limiting phrase "laws providing for equal rights." In 1910, when
the jurisdiction of the circuit courts was merged into that of the district courts with original
jurisdiction remaining only in the district courts, the limiting phrase was retained. There is
nothing to indicate that Congress intended to limit the jurisdiction of the district court by
inserting the qualifying phrase from the circuit court provision. See S. REP. No. 388, 61st
Cong.,2d Sess.,pt. 1,at 15 (1910).
In Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947), Judge
Learned Hand held that a school teacher's claim that her "privilege" under federal ldw was
violated when she was fired for being absent for four days to serve on a federal jury stated a
cause of action under section 1983. The federal statute creating the "privilege" to serve on a
jury was certainly not a "law providing for equal rights." For other cases where district courts
have assumed that section 1343(3) provides jurisdiction of suits to redress the deprivation of
rights conferred by a federal statute, see 49 CALIF. L. REv. supra note 4, at 150 n.42. See
also Note, Damage Suits Under Civil Rights A ctfor Deprivationof FederalStatutory Rights,
47 COLUM. L. REv. 1082 (1947); 66 HARV. L. REv., supra note 40, at 1291-93; 16 GEO.WASH.
L. REV. 260 (1948); 26 Tax. L. REV. 531 (1948).
71. 67 COLUM. L. Rev., supra note 22, at 114.
72. See id., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 251
(2d Cir. 1969) (concurring opinion).
73. See 416 F.2d at 250. Note how the court repeatedly confuses sections 1343(3) and 1983
and speaks of section 1983 as being jurisdictional.
74. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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its inconsistency with the federal statute under which the Aid For
Dependent Children program was administered. The Alabama
regulation denied payments to the children of a mother who
cohabited with an able-bodied man. Friendly rationalized that
perhaps the denial of payment caused not merely economic loss, a
property right, but also infringed the "liberty" of the children to
grow up with financial aid or infringed Mrs. Smith's "liberty" to
have Mr. Williams visit her on weekends! 5 Relying on King v.
Smith, a district court has found 1343(3) jurisdiction where the
plaintiffs alleged a denial of equal protection in the dispensation of
back-to-school clothing allowances. 76 After discussing Judge
Friendly's characterization of the rights infringed in King, the
district judge concluded: "[I]s there not also a similar 'liberty' in
this case to have clothing to wear to school?"
These welfare cases seem to recognize that Stone's distinction is
difficult to apply because the loss of property often has an effect on
personal interests.78 Besides assuming that personal ahd proprietary
interests are separable, Stone's formula has the effect of designating
"personal interests" as more deserving of federal protection. But as
Professor Reich has observed, civil liberties must have a basis in
property:
[T]he Bill of Rights comes into play only at extraordinary moments of
conflict or crisis, [but] property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary
affairs of life. Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon
the existence of private property. Political rights presuppose that individuals
and private groups have the will and the means to act independently. But so '
long as individuals are motivated largely by self-interest, their well-being must
first be independent 9

Without the economic security which proprietary rights provide,
one's personal liberty is surely less secure!' This is demonstrated in
the case of the welfare. recipient-or other poor person-where the
loss of money or property affects one's right to be free from hunger,
75. 421'F.2dat564.
76. Russo v. Shapiro, 309 F. Supp. 385 (D. Conn. 1969).

77, id. at 391.
78. See, e.g., id. at 392-93; Sweeny v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Assistance Bd., 33 F.
Supp. 587 (M.D. Pa. 1940), affd, 119 F2d 1023 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 611 (1941)
(loss of welfare affects personal rights); 66 HARv. L. REV., supra note 40, at 1289.
79. Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733,771 (1964).
80. See W. LIPPMAN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM 101 (1935); Reich, supra note 79, at 771-
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to be fully clothed, or adequately housed. It would be incongrous to
argue that the loss of the means to provide these necessities, albeit
less than the $10,000 value necessary for section 1331 jurisdiction,

is any less valuable to some people than the loss of freedom of
speech or the right to vote.s1 This is not to place "property rights"

above "personal rights" or vice versa but only to recognize that
Stone's distinction ignores the inseparability of property rights and
personal rights and fails to recognize that to many people the

deprivation of a property right worth only $1,000 is as important
as the deprivation of a personal right "incapable of pecuniary

valuation."
What Did the FramersIntend?

Since the basis for Stone's property-personal right distinction is
not evident on the face of section 1343(3), is there anything in the

legislative history of the 1871 Act or other post-Civil War legislation
to indicate that Congress intended that property interests were not

to be protected by sections 1983 and 1343(3)? Without attempting a
detailed discussion of the voluminous legislative history of the

period, it is perhaps important to point out that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment and the 1871 Act from which both section
1983 and section 1343(3) were derived evidenced no intention to

distinguish between the protection of proprietary or personal'
interests!' Of course such a conclusion is not determinative of the

scope of section 1343(3) since the problem of the coexistence of
sections 1331 and 13 4 3(3p and the intention of later Congresses still

remains. Section 1 of 1871 Act provided a cause of action to any
person who was deprived of "any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution"" under color of state law, and provided

that "such proceeding [should] be prosecuted in the several district
81. The courts are now beginning to recognize the relationship between the loss of property
and the right to life itself. See; e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337; 341-42 (1969); See also 1969 DUKE L.J. 1285, 1290-92.
82. This is not to say that the protection of property interest was emphasized in the debates
to the exclusion of personal interests, or vice versa. The point is that there was no attempt to
distinguish betweeh the two.
83. See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
84. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The title of the bill made its purpose
abundantly clear: "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." See notes 4 and 70 supra for a
discussion of the addition of the phrase "and laws" in the Revised Statutes of 1875.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 1970:819

and circuit courts of the United States .. ,"I5 The substantive
provision, which became the present section 1983, was separated
from the jurisdictional provision, which became the present section
1343, in the 1875 revision 8 The 1871 Act, popularly known as the
Ku Klux Klan Act, was intended to provide a remedy for the
deprivation of rights which had recently been secured by the
fourteenth amendment 7 The "rights, privileges, or immunities"
secured by the 1871 Act are the same "rights, privileges, or
immunities" secured by the fourteenth amendment
In passing the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress responded to reports
of the lawless conditions existing in the South in 1871 and
recognized the necessity of acting to protect person and property'
President Grant, on March 23, 1871, urged Congress to act:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life
and property insecure
the proof that such a condition of affairs exists
in some localities is now before the Senate . . . Therefore, I urgently
recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually
secure life, liberty and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of
the United States."

Thus, it appears Congress was aware that both life and property
were being rendered insecure by the lawless conditions in the South
and that legislation was needed to enforce the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment?'
85. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). See note 23 Supra for a discussion of the merger of circuit and
district court jurisdiction and note 70 supra for a discussion of the problem of interpretation
engendered by the discrepency in language between the district and circuit court provisions.
86. The common origin, combined with the fact of the almost identical phraseology of the
two statutes, has led most commentators to conclude that the scope of the two provisions is
coextensive. D. CURRIE, supra note 38, at 427 (1968); 49 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 4, at

147; 67 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 22, at 111-12, Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action
in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv., 1486, 1506 (1969); 66 HARV. L. REV.,
supra note 40, at 1289.
Judge Friendly observes that even though the two provisions are subject to the same
interpretation, it would lessen .the confusion surrounding section 1343(3) if its jurisdictional
nature was kept in mind. 421 F.2d at 565 n.8.
87. See note 84 supra and accompanying text. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171
(1967).
88. Poole, Statutory Remedies for the Protection of Civil Rights, 32 One. L. REv. 210,
222 (1953).
89. See S. REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871); H.R. REP. No. 22.42d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pts. 1-13 (1871). For an extensive discussion of the remarks of legislators concerning the
proposed legislation see 365 U.S. at 172-83.
90. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871) (emphasis added).
91. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIctI. L. REV,
1323, 1334 (1950). See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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Congress did not define very clearly exactly what "rights,
privileges, and immunities" it intended to protect by the enactment

of the fourteenth amendment, but there is no indication that personal
rights were emphasized over proprietary rights. Congressman

Bingham, the principal architect of the amendment, wanted to secure
the rights already protected by the Bill of Rights from federal

infringement against state encroachment

2

Throughout the debates

there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended that the

fourteenth amendment differentiate between personal and property
rights03

But there is one item of persuasive evidence that the framers of
the fourteenth amendment intended to protect both property and
personal rights. There is a general consensus that the amendment's

first section was intended to incorporate the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution

4

The framers of the first

Civil Rights Bill were not willing to chance a later Congress negating
their work. Entitled "An Act to protect all Persons in the United

States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their
Vindication," the first Civil Rights Act certainly protected such
property interests as the right to own land. 95 And as the title

indicates, these "property rights" being protected were considered

"civil rights." The evidence before the Thirty-ninth Congress
92. J.B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 105 (1956). Bingham
stdted that he had read Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833), where Marshall had
been forced to hold that the Bill of Rights imposed no limitations on the power of the states
"and that is what induced me to attempt to impose by constitutional amendments new
limitations on the power of the States ....
" CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 83
(1871). It is worth noting that Barron v. Baltimore was a case concerning only a property
right since the city had taken private property for public use without compensation. This at
least intimates that Bingham intended property rights to be secured by the fourteenth

amendment.
93. But see Comment, FederalCourts-JurisdictionOver Violations of Civil Liberties by

State Governments and by PrivateIndividuals,39 MIcH. L. REV. 284,287 n.13 (1939).
94. J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 183-85
(1951); H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20, 54, 96 (1908); J.B.
JAMES, supra note 92, at 128-29; CONG. GLOBE, 39 Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866) (remarks of
Rep. Eliot); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2462 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Garfield).
95. Act of April 6, 1866, ch. 3 1, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 provides:
That all persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the same

right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personalproperty, and to full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings
for. . . person andproperty, as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . . (emphasis added).
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showed that Negroes were being deprived of their right to own
property,96 and Congress intended to remedy that situation.
Section 1 of the Act of 1871 was in large measure intended to
carry out the principles embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which had been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, and
neither the 1866 Act nor the fourteenth amendment intimated that
property rights were to be protected from state infringement less
vigorously than personal rights. The post-Civil War decisions of the
Supreme Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment protected
proprietary interests 5 For example, a case decided shortly after the
passage of the 1871 Act upheld jurisdiction under section 1343(3)
when a corporation alleged that the state was interfering with the
corporation's property rights.9 When section 1 of the 1871 Act
provided district courts with jurisdiction to redress the deprivation
of "any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution
. ." it probably intended exactly that.'0
The extensive discussion of the scope of section 1983 in Monroe
0 ' seems
v. Pape"
to support this interpretation. The Monroes claimed
that the invasion of their homes by Chicago police, subsequent
warrantless search, and arrest and detention of Mr. Monroe without
warrant or prompt arraignment constituted a deprivation of their
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution"
within the meaning of section 1983. Justice Douglas stated that an
"[a]llegation of facts constituting deprivation under color of state
authority of a right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
satisfies to that extent the requirement of [section 1983]."101 Sinie
*

96. See REPORT OF C. SCHURZ, S. EXEC. Doc. No.2,39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865).
97. Senator Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, said of the Act
of 1871:
The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as defining the rights secured
by the Constitution of the United Stais when they are assailed by any State law or
under color of any State law, and it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil
rights bill [Act of 1866] which has since become part of the Constitution [fourteenth

amendment]. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871).
98. See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1888); Barbier v. Connolly,
11 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); Butchers' Union Slaughter-house and Livestock Landing Co. v.
Crescent City Livestock Landing & Slaughter-house Co., Ill U.S. 746, 758 (1884) (Field, J.,
concurring).
99. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393 (No. 10,336) (C.C.N.D.
111. 1873).
100. But see, 39 MICH.L. REV.,supra note 93, at 287.
101. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
102. 365 U.S. at 171. See also id. at 206 (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is
guaranteed from state infringement by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court upheld the Monroes' claim against
the police officer, under section 1983. Acknowledging that the
purpose of the 1871 Act was to provide a remedy for the deprivation
of rights secured -by the fourteenth amendment including the right
to due process, the Court made no distinction between property or
personal rights. 03 In pointing out that the decision ignored Holt and
Hague, a commentator has concluded: "As a result of the Monroe
decision, it seems unlikely that the district courts can avoid
becoming forums for litigating every invasion of personal and
property interest alleged to be a denial of due process."' 1
Is Stone's FormulationNecessary?
Justice Stone justified his formulation ofsection 1343(3) in order
to reconcile section 1331 with section 1343(3). Was such a
distinction really necessary to explain the coexistence of the two
provisions, or can section 1343(3) be interpreted to provide federal
jurisdiction against state deprivation of "any right, privilege, or
immunity," regardless whether personal or proprietary? It must be
remembered that Justice Stone was trying to preserve section 1343(3)
jurisdiction from being swallowed by section.1331(l), not vice
versa." 5 He did not argue that if section 1343(3) were interpreted to
include property rights there would be no federal question
jurisdiction left for the federal courts to exercise; rather he contended
that in some types of federal cases Congress did not intend to apply
the jurisdictional amount requirement. Obviously, Stone felt that
personal rights such as freedom of speech or the right to vote, which
could not be easily valued, were not intended by Congress to be
subject to the amount requirement. Freedom of speech was the right
at issue in Hague, and the defendants' argued that there were no
jurisdiction under section 1343(3) even for the infringement of rights
of personal liberty. Thus Stone's formulation at least insured that
personal rights would not have to meet the jurisdictional amount
103. See 49 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 4, at 160.
104. Id. The scope of section 1983 is generally recognized to be coextensive with section
1343(3). Thus, an expansive interpretation of one necessarily affects the interpretation of the
other. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
105. 307 U.S. at 530, 531.
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requirement. As the American Law Institute's study on jurisdiction
stated:
[I]nsofar as it [Stone's formulation], dispenses with a monetary requirement
where suit is to redress a right which cannot be valued in money, it is clearly
desirable. Whether it is sound, however, to bar from federal court cases
involving constitutional issues because a property right of less than $10,000
is involved, is more doubtful.''

If section 1343(3) were construed to protect both property and

personal rights, section 1331 certainly would not be rendered
superfluous." 7 It must be remembered that section 1343(3) applies
only to an alleged infringement of rights "under color of state law,"
and consequently in many federal question cases, such as suits
against officials of the federal government, the jurisdictional amount
is still required absent other statutory provisions.' The purpose of
section 1343(3)-to protect against unconstitutional state
authority-is more limited in scope than general "federal quesqon"
jurisdiction. Further, it must be noted that the many statutes
conferring jurisdiction without any monetary requirement lessen the
0 9 Perhaps
impact of the section 1331 requirement on jurisdiction."
the fact that Congress has enacted the large number of statutes
which except the majority of cases from any jurisdictional amount
requirement lends support to the theory that state courts are not
always satisfactory forums for the protection of federal rights, even
when the amount in controversy is small."0 The American Law
Institute's proposal to abolish the amount requirement altogether for
federal question jurisdiction"' would effectively repeal section
1343(3),112 and arguably supports the contention that where a federal
106. ALl STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,

App. B, 202 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1966).
107. See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
108. See. e.g., Fischler v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.), affd per curlamn on
other grounds,218 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1954); Powers v. Gold, 124 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mass. 1953);
,Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945). See also Friedenthal, New Limitations
on FederalJurisdiction, II STAN. L. REV. 213, 217-18 (1959); Wechsler, FederalJurisdiction
and the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 LAW

&

CONTEMP. PROD. 216,225-26 (1948).

109. See D. CURRIE, supra note 38, at 425 (partial listing of special statutes dispensing with
jurisdictional amount); C. WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 93; ALl STUDY, supra note 106, at 78.
110. Friedenthal, supra note 110, at 217.
11I. ALl STUDY, supra note 106, at 79. There being more justification for retaining the
$10,000 requirement in diversity cases where the parties are relying on state law than where
the right relied on is federal, the ALl limited its proposal to abolishing the $10,000 amount
when the question is a federal one.
112. Id. at 78-81. Other commentators have also suggested abolishing the amount
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right is asserted, the federal government should provide a federal
forum regardless of the nature of the right infringed.
Conclusion
At a time when there is increasing recognition that the federal
judiciary should be the primary protector of federal rights, an
exclusion of federal claims from federal courts because they involve
property rights, albeit small, is no longer justified. As discussed
above, the deprivation of property is no less important to many
people than the so-called rights of personal liberty-indeed, for
many individuals, the two are inextricably bound together1 3 The
distinction between personal and property rights is often difficult, if
not impossible, to make as evidenced by the welfare and employment
cases, and nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress
distinguished between the protection of these rights in. passing the
Act of 1871.111 Further, section 1331 would not be rendered
superfluous-or any more so than it already is-by a construction
of section 1343(3) which would include the protection of property
rights."' In Eisen v. Eastman, Judge Friendly recognized some of
these criticisms of Stone's test and admitted doubts as to its
continuing validity, but nevertheless upheld it "generously
construed." l Perhaps Judge Friendly was aware that one may
"generously construe" any test to such an extent that it is no longer
meaningful and then may be unceremoniously discarded.
requirement. See Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: The Need
for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction,and Parties
Defendant. 68 MIcH. L. REV. 389,437-46 (1970).

113.
114.
115.
116.

See notes 78-81 supraand accompanying text.
See notes 82-100 supraand accompanying text.
See notes 106-09 supraand accompanying text.
421 F.2d at 566.

